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This research is an investigation of whether consciousness—one’s ongoing
experience—influences one’s behavior and, if so, how. Analysis of the components,
structure, properties, and temporal sequences of consciousness has established that,
(1) contrary to one’s intuitive understanding, consciousness does not have an active,
executive role in determining behavior; (2) consciousness does have a biological
function; and (3) consciousness is solely information in various forms. Consciousness
is associated with a flexible response mechanism (FRM) for decision-making, planning,
and generally responding in nonautomatic ways. The FRM generates responses by
manipulating information and, to function effectively, its data input must be restricted
to task-relevant information. The properties of consciousness correspond to the various
input requirements of the FRM; and when important information is missing from
consciousness, functions of the FRM are adversely affected; both of which indicate that
consciousness is the input data to the FRM. Qualitative and quantitative information
(shape, size, location, etc.) are incorporated into the input data by a qualia array of colors,
sounds, and so on, which makes the input conscious. This view of the biological function
of consciousness provides an explanation why we have experiences; why we have
emotional and other feelings, and why their loss is associated with poor decision-making;
why blindsight patients do not spontaneously initiate responses to events in their blind
field; why counter-habitual actions are only possible when the intended action is in mind;
and the reason for inattentional blindness.
Keywords: behavioral flexibility, components of experience, flexible response mechanism, function of
consciousness, qualia array
1. INTRODUCTION
Consciousness science has been the subject of considerable
research effort in recent decades, and this has led to the cre-
ation of very many theories about consciousness, but none has
broad acceptance within the scientific community (Pereira et al.,
2010; Katz, 2013). Katz commented that the profusion of theo-
retical approaches suggests there is a profound problem in this
domain. A central problem in consciousness science is that we
still do not know the biological function of consciousness1 —we
do not know why we have experiences (Bayne, 2009; de Gardelle
and Kouider, 2009; Seth, 2009). When the function of conscious-
ness is known, that knowledge is likely to have a significant effect
on our understanding of consciousness, and on future directions
in research.
Of the very many theories of consciousness proposed in
recent decades, most attempt to explain how consciousness
arises. Some examples are: higher-order thought (Rosenthal,
1986, 2000), integrated information (Tononi et al., 1998;
Tononi, 2004), neural correlates of consciousness (Crick and
Koch, 1990; Koch, 2004), re-entrant interaction (Edelman,
1992, 2003), quantum coherence (Hameroff, 1994; Hameroff
and Penrose, 1996), and sensorimotor (O’Regan and Noë,
1Consciousness is used in the sense of phenomenal consciousness (Block,
1995); one’s ongoing experience.
2001) theories. All of these theories, and many others,
are concerned primarily with how consciousness arises, and
only secondarily, if at all, with the biological function of
consciousness.
The othermain category of consciousness theories is those that
describe how consciousness and its associated neural processes
interact with other systems in the brain. Examples are global
workspace theory (Baars, 1988, 1997), and supramodular inter-
action theory (Morsella, 2005). Each of these two theories also
includes a statement of how consciousness arises.
Several of these theories refer to the biological function of con-
sciousness, with statements ranging from the general comment
that consciousness is adaptive, to statements that consciousness
functions as a form of workspace with input from and output to
various kinds of unconscious processing (Baars, 1997), or that its
function is to produce a single representation and make it avail-
able to the parts of the brain that choose between different plans
for action (Crick and Koch, 1998). These andmany other theories
have proposed a similar function for consciousness to the present
paper; to contribute to responding more flexibly when automatic
actions are unsuitable. What is new about the approach presented
here is that I have examined the properties of consciousness and
concluded from them that consciousness can only have biological
value as input to a mechanism, or mechanisms, that determine
behavior.
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Consciousness can only have biological value if it benefits the
organism by changing its behavior. In general, an evolved prop-
erty of an organism can be adaptive as a result of changes to
its body, or its behavior, or both its body and its behavior, that
enhance the organism’s ability to survive, reproduce, and perpet-
uate its genetic material through subsequent generations. Such
changes may assist in the avoidance of predators, getting food,
digestion, healing injuries, sexual function, and so on. The evo-
lution of conscious neural structures2 did not involve physical
changes outside of the nervous system that could confer physical
advantages such as improved camouflage, quicker movement, or
improved organ function. Therefore, if consciousness is adaptive,
its biological value must result from allowing improved behav-
ioral choices for its possessors. Hence, consciousness can only
have adaptive value and a biological function by virtue of its being
able to influence behavior.
The purpose of this research was to establish the biologi-
cal function of consciousness—the actual role of consciousness
in the selection and control of certain behaviors—and then to
demonstrate that this biological function leads to an explana-
tion for the known properties of consciousness. The research
begins with consideration of three topics: the evidence that one
experiences no mental3 processes4, the evidence that conscious-
ness is adaptive, and the evidence that consciousness is solely
information5. The logical sequence of this research, and the prin-
cipal lines of evidence and conclusions are represented in the
flowchart (Figure 1).
The research has two parts. The first part, shown above the
broken line in the flowchart, is concerned with establishing that
consciousness has a biological function, and that its function
must consist in being the data input to processes for determining
behavior. The second part of the research, represented below the
broken line in the flowchart, is a collection of evidence pointing to
consciousness being the input to a mechanism for manipulating
2Conscious neural structure: Consciousness is a property of neurons in a cer-
tain state or a certain structure, and I refer to this neural structure as a
“conscious neural structure.”
3Mental refers to events or information in the mind; and mind refers to what
thinks, feels, reasons, and so on, and which is the seat of consciousness. Mind
includes consciousness, the conscious neural structure of which consciousness
is a property, and nonconscious mechanisms that manipulate information in
reasoning, planning, and determining behavior. I assume all these compo-
nents of mind are physical properties of events in the brain, based on the
view, standard across the natural sciences, that all phenomena are physical
phenomena.
4Process is used in the sense of an action, or actions, that lead to a change in
something. Any change in what one experiences is a result of mental processes,
that is, the action of manipulating information in the brain.
5Information, as used here, is data, or facts; it may include data or facts from
physical and other measurements or observations, or from any other source,
and the results of calculations, inferences, and mental processes, or outputs
from other data processing, and their conscious or nonconscious representa-
tions. (This usage of “information” is different from the information theory
usage as reduction in uncertainty, which is the quantification of a property of
information, as I use the term. “Information” as I use it is a broader term; the
difference could be expressed by saying that as used here, information also has
meaning, or each piece of information establishes a context within which it
may reduce uncertainty).
FIGURE 1 | Establishing that consciousness is input to a mechanism
which generates thoughts, intentional actions, plans, decisions, and
so on.
data to generate responses in situations where automatic pro-
grams are likely to produce less than optimal behavior. This
mechanism, the flexible response mechanism (FRM), is the source
of thoughts, intentional actions, decisions, plans, daydreams, and
so on.
2. EVIDENCE THAT CONSCIOUSNESS HAS NO EXECUTIVE
FUNCTION
Some of the many published claims that consciousness incorpo-
rates no processing at all, or is not involved in particular kinds
of processing, are listed in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, I provide
evidence from introspection and experiments that demonstrates,
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in relation to the principal mental activities, that there is no
processing of information in consciousness.
2.1. PUBLISHED CLAIMS THAT CONSCIOUSNESS INCLUDES NO
MENTAL PROCESSES
Lashley (1958, p. 4) wrote that “No activity of mind is ever con-
scious” (emphasis in original). His examples were that we do not
experience how our perceptions are created, or how sentences are
produced. He also wrote that acts of will, decisions, logic, and the
formation andmanipulation of abstractions, are all nonconscious
neural processes.
Miller (1962) also made an early contribution to arguments
that none of the processes of the conscious mind are experienced.
He wrote that thinking is a preconscious process, for example
when one recalls something from memory “consciousness gives
no clue as to where the answer comes from; the processes that
produce it are unconscious. It is the result of thinking, not the
process of thinking, that appears spontaneously in consciousness”
(p. 72, emphasis in original). Miller wrote that processes leading
to perception are complex, and we have no awareness of them;
perception is an unconscious process. “What is true of thinking
and of perceiving is true in general. We can state it as a general
rule: No activity of mind is ever conscious” (p. 72).
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) were the first to provide evidence,
based on a review of published experimental work, that we never
really know why we do the things we do, why we choose the things
we choose, or why we prefer the things we prefer. When people
are questioned about these matters, both the questioner and the
questioned are ordinarily unaware that the answers given are nec-
essarily fabrications. The conclusions of Nisbett and Wilson were
supported by the research of Johansson et al. (2005, 2006).
In a now classic study, Velmans (1991) examined informa-
tion from a variety of sources in search of evidence of processing
in consciousness, and found none. After reviewing the relevant
literature, and other considerations, Velmans reported that:
• Analysis and selection of information for entry to conscious-
ness is unconscious—one is not aware of any of this analysis as
it happens.
• Control of attention is unconscious—consciousness cannot
select what is to enter itself.
• Learning and memory are unconscious processes—processes
that create and retrieve memories are not accessible to intro-
spection.
• Planning—for example, formulating ideas and translating
them into a suitable form for speech are not conscious—one
is only aware of exactly what one is going to say after one has
said it.
• Creativity is not a conscious process.
• Organizing our responses is unconscious—we respond to a
skin stimulus long before it has entered consciousness.
• Determining priorities is unconscious—what is important at
any given moment requires continuous updating in a con-
stantly changing world, and we are not aware of this occurring.
• Production of voluntary responses is unconscious—there is
no awareness of any of the processing needed to execute a
response.
Velmans concluded that data for entry into experience are pre-
selected unconsciously; there was no direct evidence of data
processing in consciousness—no choices or control of behavior
occur in consciousness; and, post-conscious data processing is
entirely unconscious—behavior that follows on from events in
consciousness is under automatic control.
Smith (1999) stated that it is logically impossible to con-
sciously choose one’s next word or one’s next experience, because
they would have to be conscious already. Therefore, they are not
consciously determined andmust be generated by processes in the
brain of which one is not conscious. And, when trying to think of
the next word to write, one is occasionally conscious of a “waiting
period for the next word that will appear. . . an unconscious ‘incu-
bation’ process takes place ending when the next word appears”
(Smith, 1999, p. 426). And, one is not conscious of the computa-
tions done by the brain, but only of its decisions or plans; Smith
wrote that consciousness has no computational powers.
Edelman and Tononi (2000, p. 58) wrote, “when we con-
sciously add two numbers together, it seems that we simply pass
a request to our brain, the brain carries it out, and the answer is
delivered.... When we search for an item inmemory, we formulate
the question in our consciousness. Unbeknownst to us, the brain
seems to search for a while, and suddenly the response is made
available to consciousness.”
Dehaene and Naccache (2001, p. 16) wrote that “we can never
be conscious of the inner workings of our cerebral processes, but
only of their outputs. A classical example is syntax: we can become
conscious that a sentence is not grammatical, but we have no
introspection on the inner workings of the syntactical apparatus
that underlies this judgment.”
Wegner (2002) wrote that creative insights are unexpected and
appear to be involuntary; adding two numbers occurs uncon-
sciously; highly skilled actions happen without involving con-
sciousness (driving a car, playing amusical instrument). He stated
that “unconscious and inscrutable mechanisms create both con-
scious thought about action and the action, and also produce the
sense of will we experience by perceiving the thought as the cause
of the action” (p. 98).
Pockett (2004) wrote that problem solving is unconscious—
only the solution is presented to the conscious mind, and “the
creator tends to have the eerie feeling that ‘It wasn’t me who did
it”’ (p. 31); “I know what I think only when I see what I write”
(p. 31); and that the experience of volition is not necessary for
the performance of actions that would normally be considered
volitional.
Umiltá(2007, p. 328) wrote that “we are never conscious of
the inner workings of our cognitive processes, but only of their
outputs.”
In summary, according to these researchers: The processes
leading to perception are nonconscious6 (Lashley, 1958; Miller,
1962). Control of attention, and analysis and selection of infor-
mation for entry to consciousness are nonconscious (Velmans,
1991; Smith, 1999). Intentional actions are under nonconscious
6Nonconscious refers to information or events in the brain that are not being
experienced, some of which are experienceable, some not; it is synonymous
with one meaning of “unconscious.”
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control (Velmans, 1991; Wegner, 2002). Choices and decisions
are nonconscious processes (Lashley, 1958; Nisbett and Wilson,
1977; Velmans, 1991; Smith, 1999; Johansson et al., 2005, 2006).
Thoughts are determined nonconsciously (Miller, 1962; Velmans,
1991; Smith, 1999; Wegner, 2002; Pockett, 2004). Before speak-
ing or writing, one may know what one is going to speak or
write about, because the thought has already been nonconsciously
determined, but the selection and articulation of the words are
nonconscious processes (Lashley, 1958; Smith, 1999; Velmans,
2002; Libet, 2004; Pockett, 2004). Problem solving and creativ-
ity are nonconscious (Velmans, 1991; Wegner, 2002; Pockett,
2004). Skilled actions are nonconsciously controlled (Wegner,
2002). Numerical addition is a nonconscious process (Edelman
and Tononi, 2000; Wegner, 2002). Memory storage and recall are
nonconscious processes (Miller, 1962; Velmans, 1991; Edelman
and Tononi, 2000). Logic, and the formation andmanipulation of
abstractions, are nonconscious processes (Lashley, 1958). There
is no evidence of any data7 processing in consciousness (Miller,
1962; Velmans, 1991; Smith, 1999; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Umiltá, 2007). This is not a complete list of such claims, but I
hope it is sufficient to establish that many researchers have come
to the conclusion either that one experiences nomental processes,
or that at least some of what are regarded, according to com-
monsense, as mental processing functions of consciousness are,
in reality, never experienced.
In what follows, I examine a number of these claims in more
detail. My aim is to present evidence that supports these claims,
and refutes other claims, which continue to appear in scien-
tific and philosophical publications, that our thoughts or feelings
choose, initiate or control our actions, or that one can observe
every stage in a “conscious” choice or decision.
2.2. INTROSPECTIVE AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE THAT ONE
EXPERIENCES NO MENTAL PROCESSES
Rosenthal (1986, p. 356) commented that “relative to what we
now know about other natural phenomena, we still have strik-
ingly scant understanding of the nature of the mental. So intro-
spection looms large as a source of information, just as sense
perception was amore central source of knowledge about physical
reality before the flourishing of the relevant systematic sciences.”
For those who have developed the necessary skills, introspection
can be an important source of information about consciousness,
and such information is especially valuable when there is a
convergence between subjective and objective measures (Jack and
Shallice, 2001; Jack, 2013).
In the following subsections, I describe evidence from both
introspection and experiments and, as will be apparent, these two
lines of evidence are mutually confirmatory whenever both are
available for similar situations. This evidence supports the view of
the researchers listed in the previous section who stated that one
does not experience the actual mental process during any men-
tal activity, and it demonstrates that consciousness cannot have
an executive role. One may experience the starting conditions,
7Data, as used here, are primary information, such as information from the
external senses; or are information that is input to, being processed in, or
output from a mechanism for manipulating, or processing, information.
stages during processing, or the final outcome of mental pro-
cesses, but there are always gaps in one’s experience, and one
never experiences the actual data manipulation that generates the
outcome.
2.2.1. Intentionally initiating an action is a nonconscious process
When I decide to pick up a cup and do so, I may believe that
my thought initiates my action, but what I observe is I have the
thought of picking up the cup and then reach out and take the
cup. I do not experience the informationmanipulations that must
occur to initiate my action, and I have no evidence that my action
is consciously initiated. One tends to assume one’s intentional
actions are consciously initiated, but as Wegner and Wheatley
(1999) reported, we may perceive our actions as consciously
caused if the thought occurs before the act and is consistent with
the act, and there are no other likely causes.
Libet and coworkers (Libet et al., 1983; Libet, 1996) described
a series of experiments in which subjects were instructed to move
a finger at a moment of their own choosing, and to note the
time of awareness of “wanting,” “urge,” “intention,” or “decision”
to move. Libet and coworkers recorded the time of intention to
move and the time of onset of the related readiness potential
(RP), a scalp-recorded negative potential, which was known to
precede physical actions. They found that the RP preceded the
conscious intention to act by about 350ms. They wrote that, “the
brain evidently ‘decides’ to initiate or, at the least, prepare to ini-
tiate the act at a time before there is any reportable subjective
awareness that such a decision has taken place. It is concluded
that cerebral initiation even of a spontaneous voluntary act, of the
kind studied here, can and usually does begin unconsciously” (p.
640, emphasis in original). Keller and Heckhausen (1990) repli-
cated the experiment of Libet and co-workers and confirmed their
conclusions.
Haggard and Eimer (1999) repeated the Libet experiments but,
in some trials, they allowed free choice which index finger to
move. They also recorded the lateral readiness potential (LRP),
which is a measure of the difference between levels of premotor
activation on the active and inactive sides. Their data showed that
the LRP was a more appropriate observation than the RP, and
that the LRP preceded the intention to move, but by less time.
They claimed that the experienced intention to move reflected
neural events associated with implementation of the movement.
Haggard (2005) wrote that the frontal and parietal lobes prepare
motor actions and produce the experience of intention.
Trevena and Miller (2002) measured RPs and LRPs, and
employed statistical methods to analyze their measurements.
They found that LRP is the relevant indicator, and that some
perceived decisions occurred before the LRP, though on aver-
age they were after the LRP. They concluded that “inferring the
direction of mind-body causation on the basis of temporal dis-
crepancy alone is complicated by the difficulty of precisely timing
both neural onsets and subjective experiences” (p. 132).
Banks and Pockett (2007) reviewed all these studies, and
other relevant work, and concluded that the evidence appeared
to support the view that the decision to act is prepared non-
consciously before the conscious decision. Thus, the evidence
from introspection and experiments supports the view that
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consciousness does not cause the action, but merely indicates
what the action will be (Wegner and Bargh, 1998; Pockett, 2006).
Evidence from experiments that involve the subjective timing
of decisions always has an element of inconclusiveness because of
the difficulty of determining the exact moment of the decision.
However, the conclusion from them that actions are always ini-
tiated nonconsciously is supported by the results of Hansen and
Skavensky (1985), discussed below, and it is supported by intro-
spective observations, and from the fact that a decision when to
act is similar in character to other decisions for which there is
evidence they are nonconsciously determined.
2.2.2. Intentional control of actions is a nonconscious process
When I slowly and attentively reach out and pick up a book, I
may believe my movements are consciously controlled, but what
I experience is an intention to control the movements plus con-
sciously monitoring my arm movements (Smith, 1999). There
is no experience of consciously controlling the movement. For
example, if I see my hand is reaching toward the wrong book my
hand moves to the correct location, but the processes that adjust
its movement are unknown to me; control of the motor systems
is not accessible to consciousness.
When one strikes a nail with a hammer, one pays close
attention to the task and might think the movement of the ham-
mer is under conscious control. However, Hansen and Skavensky
(1985) reported evidence that the hammer is controlled non-
consciously. They described an experiment in which they used
a hammer to hit a briefly illuminated point of light arranged to
occur somewhere on a line from left to right in front of them.
At the same time, their saccadic eye movements were recorded.
During saccades, they were not consciously aware of seeing the
light but they swung the hammer in response to the light,
and their hits were as fast and accurate as when they reported
they had seen the light. Since their speed and accuracy were
the same, the mechanism would appear to have been the same
whether or not they were conscious of the light. The initiation
and control of the hammer movement were both nonconscious
processes.
Correct adjustment of hand movement toward a target that
has changed position can occur under conditions where par-
ticipants are not consciously aware the target has moved, and
therefore their hand movement could not be under conscious
control (Bridgeman et al., 1979; Goodale et al., 1986; Pélisson
et al., 1986; Prablanc and Martin, 1992). Intentional movement
toward a target object is corrected within 100–120ms after hand
movement begins, or after the target has changed position (Smith
and Bowen, 1980; Soechting and Lacquaniti, 1983; Zelaznik et al.,
1983; Castiello et al., 1991; Prablanc and Martin, 1992), but this
is less than the time taken to experience movement of the hand
or target, which is about 150–300ms for most adults at ordi-
nary stimulus intensities (Libet et al., 1964, 1991; Libet, 1965,
1985; Meador et al., 1996; Ray et al., 1998, 1999). Therefore, these
intentional actions must be nonconsciously controlled.
Nonconscious visual systems can accurately control inten-
tional behavior even when the conscious visual representation is
in error, because behavior is controlled on the basis of noncon-
scious representations that are generally less prone to error than
our perceptual representations (Bridgeman et al., 1997; Rossetti,
1998; Bridgeman, 2002; Umiltá, 2007).
The vast majority of experiments investigating the control of
behavior related to whether conscious or nonconscious visual
information was employed to control behavior, and they con-
sistently found that control is nonconscious. However, Paillard
et al. (1983) showed that unperceived tactile information could
also control behavior. They studied a person who had suffered
neurological damage that resulted in the total loss of experi-
enced sensation on her right side. They described an experi-
ment in which the woman was blindfolded and then touched
at points on her right hand. She had no conscious awareness
of the contact, but when asked to touch the point of contact
with her left hand was able to do so without difficulty. The
woman’s action in touching the point of contact was a volun-
tary movement, which ordinarily would be assumed to be under
conscious control. But the fact that she was unable to experience
the contact showed that her movement was controlled noncon-
sciously. Since she had no difficulty using her nonconscious tactile
information for controlling her movements it is likely that she
was using the same system as she used before her injury (see
Rossetti, 1998, for evidence on tactile and proprioceptive data
for action).
It seems that action control is always nonconscious, whatever
the data source. Evidence that consciousness does not directly
control actions has been reviewed (for example, Rossetti, 1998;
Rossetti and Pisella, 2002; Goodale and Humphrey, 2005; Umiltá,
2007).
2.2.3. Choices and decisions are nonconscious processes
As an example of a “conscious” decision followed by action, I
am engrossed in a particularly interesting article when a sound
momentarily distracts me. Having broken the spell of the arti-
cle, I ask myself whether I will return to it immediately, or have
a coffee first. Shall I continue reading to find where the article is
taking me, or shall I stop and enjoy a drink? I am aware of a kind
of tension, of opposing impulses. Then I get up from my chair
and make myself a coffee. I know the choice has been made, but I
experienced no decision process.
Another way one becomes aware of the outcome of one’s deci-
sion is by one’s feelings about the issue under consideration.
Depending on the nature of the choice that one faces, one’s feeling
of knowing the outcome may come quickly, or there may be an
intervening period of uncomfortable uncertainty or indecision.
And the feeling of decisionmay come suddenly or it may be a slow
realization. When it comes, the feeling could be of preference for
a particular object, or an inclination toward a particular action.
One may have thought about an issue long and hard, working
through all the various considerations, perhaps even writing them
down. Then, at some point, one knows one’s “conscious” choice.
When making a choice or decision, the step from awareness
of the various options to one’s decision is a nonconscious pro-
cess (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Johansson et al., 2005, 2006).
In an investigation of the decision process, Petitmengin et al.
(2013), enhanced their subjects’ recollection of decisions by an
elicitation interview method, so as to access their decision pro-
cesses. Their subjects recovered much of the sequence of events
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surrounding their decisions, but there was no reference to their
reporting all the data manipulations central to a decision. Their
reports are much as one observes when taking careful note of
events during the course of a decision; experiencing the sen-
sory and emotional information prior to the decision, followed,
perhaps after some delay, by an awareness of one’s decision
(which has been nonconsciously determined). The experience
of becoming aware of the outcome of the nonconscious deci-
sion process may be what Petitmengin et al. were reporting
(p. 665) when they referred to “an internal criterion inform-
ing the subject of the fact that his decision has been made
(sense of relief, of determination. . .).” Petitmengin et al. did not
report the actual mental process central to their subjects’ deci-
sions, and therefore their research results do not contradict the
evidence that the core process of making a decision is not expe-
rienced; only events before and after this process are accessible to
consciousness.
Haggard and Eimer (1999) investigated the relationship
between the timing of neural events and the perceived time
of choosing to make one of two alternative voluntary actions
(whether to move the left or right index finger). They demon-
strated that the decision, “left or right” was apparent from the
LRP before the perceived intention to move. They wrote (p. 132)
that “the LRP is a relatively late event in the physiological chain
leading to action,” but it appeared to precede conscious awareness
of an intention tomove, therefore the decision was made noncon-
sciously. In a report of functional magnetic resonance imaging
studies during decision processes, Soon et al. (2008, p. 545) wrote
that “two specific regions in the frontal and parietal cortex of
the human brain had considerable information that predicted the
outcome of a motor decision the subject had not yet consciously
made.” Both these reports support the view that decisions are
nonconscious processes.
2.2.4. The control of attention is always nonconscious
There are two forms of attention control: exogenous automatic
orienting, and endogenous voluntary control. Orienting is auto-
matic and nonconscious, but voluntary control of attention must
also be nonconscious because we have no awareness of choosing
what we will attend to Velmans (1991).
Velmans (1991, 2009) wrote that it is logically impossible for
consciousness to select what enters itself, unless it is already being
experienced. This argumentmust be valid for the very many occa-
sions when our attentionmoves to something that was not already
in mind, but it is not valid for some of our movements of atten-
tion. For example, I am hearing a noise, and I attend to it because
I am curious where it is coming from; or I look more closely at
an insect on a wall; or my attention moves from one flower to an
adjacent one in the garden. I was experiencing these things before
I chose to focus on them, so are these movements of attention
consciously determined?
First, it is likely that the same mechanisms of selection apply
whether or not the object was being perceived prior to the move-
ment of attention, which would suggest they are nonconscious.
Second, voluntary control of attention amounts to intentionally
choosing which information will be experienced and adjusting
one’s attention accordingly. In relation to the control of attention
(just as with other choices, decisions, and control of action) some
aspects of the prior information may be conscious, but the cru-
cial decision and control processes are never observed. Voluntary
and involuntary movements of attention are both controlled
nonconsciously.
2.3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In any intentional action, one never experiences the complete
sequence of events from the starting conditions to completing
the action. Bowers (1984, p. 249) wrote that “one can introspec-
tively notice and/or recall antecedents of one’s behavior but the
causal connection linking the determining antecedents and the
behavior to be explained is simply not directly accessible to intro-
spection. Rather, the causal link between antecedents and their
consequences is provided by an inference, however implicit and
invisible.”
There are gaps in every experience of intentional choice, inten-
tional initiation of responses, intentional control of attention or
behavior, and in thinking, speaking, problem solving, creativity,
and every other action with which consciousness is associated;
and in each of these activities the executive mental process is
missing from consciousness. However, since we never experience
mental processes, we cannot know what it would be like to experi-
ence them. One can only know that one does not experience these
processes by the fact that a stage in the events is absent, though, in
the ordinary course of events, one generally does not notice this.
All the “real work” associated with consciousness is actually not
conscious; all behavior (and experiences) of conscious organisms
are under nonconscious control.
The absence of data processing in consciousness was assumed
by Velmans (1991, 2002) and others (Pockett, 2004; Robinson,
2012) to imply that consciousness had no biological function.
However, in the words of Smith (1999, p. 426), “being unable
to ‘act’. . . does not, however, imply serving no purpose.” Or as
Gomes (2005, p. 78) wrote, “consciousness may usefully be con-
sidered to influence the other brain systems that directly cause
behavior.” Consciousness could be biologically valuable in a non-
executive role associated with the generation of behavior. In fact,
the evidence that consciousness does have biological value is
strong, and this is detailed in the next section.
3. EVIDENCE THAT CONSCIOUSNESS HAS BIOLOGICAL
VALUE
An issue that is important when assessing the evidence for
consciousness being adaptive, is whether or not consciousness
could be considered as functionally separable from the con-
scious neural structure of which it is a property. This question
is important because much of the evidence that consciousness
is adaptive depends upon information that is common to con-
sciousness and the conscious neural structure. There have been
claims that the conscious neural structure has biological value but
consciousness is functionless (Pockett, 2004; Blakemore, 2005;
Robinson, 2007). This amounts to a claim that, in terms of its
functioning, consciousness is separable from the conscious neural
structure. There have also been counter claims that consciousness
is integral to the conscious neural structure (for example, Gomes,
2005).
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There are reasons to believe that consciousness cannot exist
without the conscious neural structure, and that the neural struc-
ture by its nature produces consciousness, so one cannot have the
neural structure without having consciousness (Loorits, 2014).
Therefore, the conscious neural structure and consciousness, as
its property, are functionally inseparable, and any evidence that
consciousness is adaptive is evidence that both consciousness and
the conscious neural structure are adaptive.
3.1. THE COMPLEXITY ARGUMENT THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS
ADAPTIVE
A number of scientists have commented that consciousness
appears to be so complex it must be adaptive (for example,
Gray, 1971, 1995; Nichols and Grantham, 2000). Consciousness
is certainly complex, incorporating several sensory modalities,
each with a number of variants, interrelated with various felt
experiences.
When one considers the complexity of visual perception, one
appreciates that this aspect of consciousness must have evolved
in many stages, sufficient to establish that visual consciousness
does have biological value. According to Reber (1992), cerebral
achromaticity is rare, but dark–light blindness is much rarer,
and Jackson’s Principle states that evolutionarily older functions
are more robust than more recent functions. This suggests that
dark–light experience developed separately and earlier than color
experience. Additionally, a system has evolved whereby the colors
that one experiences are adjusted so as to give maximum differen-
tiation between objects (Gouras and Zrenner, 1981; Gouras, 1991;
Thompson, 1995).
Light–dark contrast, in combination with the color spectrum,
as it is employed in consciousness, is a rather complex method for
differentiating objects within our visual experience. This almost
certainly arose in stages over a significant period of evolution-
ary time, which could not have occurred without it offering
survival advantages. If visual experience provides survival advan-
tages, consciousness, of which visual experience is an integral
part, must also provide survival advantages. But, the total com-
plexity of consciousness is much greater because it includes many
other interrelated components8 : auditory experiences of pitch
and loudness; tastes and odors representing chemical informa-
tion; internal awareness of contact with objects; awareness of one’s
own bodily position and movements; perception of one’s emo-
tions and other internal states, and one’s feelings about people
objects, and events. And each of these is normally appropriately
positioned within a three-dimensional array. Consciousness is
an extremely complex phenomenon that could not have evolved
without having an important biological function.
8I use the expression components of consciousness rather than the commonly
used contents of consciousness for two reasons. First, components suggests parts
that contribute to some structure or whole, which seems appropriate in a
metaphor for consciousness, whereas contents does not imply any connec-
tion or structure between the parts. Second, contents implies the existence of
some sort of container, which must be “empty consciousness.” Consciousness
is one’s experiences, but empty consciousness would be consciousness with
no experiences, which is a contradiction in terms. Therefore, it would seem
that contents of consciousness is not a good metaphor, and components of
consciousness is preferable.
3.2. EVIDENCE FROM THE EVOLUTION OF ACCESSORY SYSTEMS
ASSOCIATED WITH CONSCIOUSNESS
The existence of accessory systems that have evolved in
association with consciousness is evidence that consciousness has
biological value and can influence behavior:
(1) The vision for perception system has evolved in addition to
the vision for action system (reviewed in Rossetti and Pisella,
2002; Glover, 2004; Goodale and Milner, 2004; Goodale and
Humphrey, 2005; Goodale, 2007; Umiltá, 2007). The fact
that a second visual system with different properties has
evolved to provide suitable information for conscious per-
ception must mean there is biological value in perceptual
systems.
(2) “Explicit” or “declarative” memory, associated with con-
sciousness, has evolved in addition to “implicit” or “non-
declarative” memory systems that serve fully nonconscious
mechanisms (Graf and Schacter, 1985; Schacter, 1987; Berry,
1993; Zola-Morgan and Squire, 1993; Eichenbaum, 1994;
Squire, 1994), and this could only have occurred because
consciousness is adaptive.
(3) Experimental evidence that nonconscious systems have
evolved for extraction of suitable external data for conscious-
ness (McCauley et al., 1980; Marcel, 1983; Groeger, 1984,
1986). This could only have occurred because consciousness
has biological value.
3.3. EVIDENCE FROM THE CORRELATION BETWEEN CONSCIOUSNESS
AND ACTUALITY
James (1879) wrote that we evolved pleasant feelings toward what
is generally good for us and unpleasant feelings toward what is
generally bad for us. He said that if consciousness had no effects,
we could quite easily have evolved with pleasant feelings toward
what harms us and unpleasant feelings toward what is good for
us, but we did not, therefore it is likely these feelings, and hence
all experiences, are adaptive.
James’ argument can be extended from feelings to all of our
experiences. When we are about to do something, if it is not a
fully automatic response, we are conscious of our intended action.
Why would it be necessary to know our intentions unless our
experiences have some influence on our behavior? Also, when-
ever we are actively involved with events, consciousness is fairly
well correlated with the facts of the situation. This is ensured by
a mechanism for reality monitoring of experiences in our ordi-
nary waking states, whenever that is necessary (Johnson and Raye,
1981). If consciousness had no effects on behavior, it would not
matter if our experiences were completely fantastical and had no
correlation with reality. But our experiences have evolved so as to
represent reality fairly accurately whenever that is necessary, and
this is evidence that consciousness can influence behavior, and is
adaptive.
3.4. EVIDENCE FROM THE SPECIAL TREATMENT OF SELF-RELATED
INFORMATION IN CONSCIOUSNESS
In general, there is a very clear separation between self-related
information and external sense information in consciousness.
Bodily sensations like pain, coldness, hunger or tiredness;
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emotional and other feelings, like anger, confidence or pleasure;
knowledge of our own choices; and awareness of our own phys-
ical boundaries, are normally well differentiated from exogenous
information.
In normal conditions, self-related information from diverse
internal sensors is always perceived as self-related, and always
located together. If consciousness had no biological function, it
could easily have been otherwise—it would have made no dif-
ference in terms of one’s survival if self-related information were
scattered across one’s experience. The fact that the perception of
self-related information has evolved so as to be experienced as
grouped together, and to have the special quality of personally
relating to oneself, is evidence that consciousness has biological
value.
3.5. CONSCIOUSNESS CAN DIRECTLY INFLUENCE ACTIONS
Conscious information can have a dominant influence on
responses. We tell others about our experiences, write about our
experiences, and think about our experiences, so consciousness
must contribute to the generation of these behaviors (for exam-
ple, Blackmore, 2004; Gomes, 2005). In everyday situations, one
is aware of an intention to do something, and then does it. Or
our feelings may interrupt our thoughts and alert us to another
priority, and we may change what we are doing.
REM atonia—the blocking of messages to major muscles
during REM dreams, when reality monitoring is switched off—
prevents us acting out our dreams (Hobson, 1988; Jouvert, 1999),
and could only have evolved because our experiences can provoke
actions.
Persaud and Cowey (2008) reported experiments with a
blindsight patient, GW, in which he was asked to report on a
stimulus present either in his blind field or his normal field. GW
was asked to say “Up” if the stimulus was in a lower quadrant
of his visual field, or his blindsight field; or “Down” if it was
in an upper quadrant. He correctly reported the opposite loca-
tion to that of the stimulus in his sighted field, but significantly
more often than chance he incorrectly reported the actual quad-
rant when the stimulus was in his blind field. He was only able to
do as instructed, and override his automatic tendency to report
the actual quadrant the stimulus was in, when the stimulus was
consciously detected.
There is considerable experimental evidence for the domi-
nance of conscious events over automatic action programs (for
example, the experimental data in McCauley et al., 1980; Marcel,
1983; Groeger, 1984, 1986; Merikle and Joordens, 1997; Rossetti,
1998; Haggard and Johnson, 2003). In each of these experiments,
when non-conscious processes extractedmultiple interpretations,
the single interpretation that consciousness was able to access had
a dominant influence on subjects’ responses.
3.6. EVIDENCE FROM THE EXISTENCE AND RARENESS OF QUALIA9
Important evidence that consciousness has biological value is
provided by the existence of qualia. Consciousness evolved as an
array of qualia of various kinds that has the capability to represent
9Qualia are the elements that together constitute ones experiences: sensory
experiences, such as colors or sounds; bodily sensations, such as pain, hotness,
visual properties such as relative size, location, movement, shape
and texture, and quantitative and qualitative properties of infor-
mation from other sensory modalities. This contributes to the
breadth of conscious information, and thereby to the complexity
argument.
If qualia were a property of all neural states, every neural
event would be conscious, which is obviously not so. Qualia
are a very rare property of neural states; and how they arise is,
at present, unknown. The fact that qualia exist but are such a
rare phenomenon indicates that they have evolved with special
properties for a particular function (see Section 4.2).
3.7. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE THAT CONSCIOUSNESS HAS
BIOLOGICAL VALUE
Consciousness is a function of living organisms, and it is unsur-
prising that it is adaptive, since most functions of organisms
have evolved to enhance their biological fitness. In summary, the
evidence that consciousness has biological value is:
(1) Consciousness is very complex.
(2) Various ancillary systems have evolved in association with
consciousness.
(3) Whenever one is actively involved with events, one’s experi-
ences are representations of them.
(4) Self-related information, which is obviously very relevant to
survival, is treated differently from all non-self information.
(5) Consciousness appears to directly influence behavior.
(6) We have consciousness because we have qualia, which are
very unusual properties of neural states and appear to have
evolved for their ability to convey important information.
We can conclude that consciousness does have biological value,
though it includes no mental processes. Therefore, consciousness
must have a nonexecutive biological function—a secondary or
supporting role to associated neural mechanisms that do have
executive functions. In the next section, I demonstrate that con-
sciousness is a changing array of various types of information,
and, incidentally, that when we analyze consciousness into its
components, we find no processes of any kind.
4. EVIDENCE THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS SOLELY
INFORMATION
4.1. THE COMPONENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS ARE ALL FORMS OF
INFORMATION
A number of researchers have claimed that consciousness—one’s
experience from moment to moment—consists of information
in various forms (Battista, 1978; Dretske, 1995, 2003; Tye, 1995;
Chalmers, 1996; Lycan, 1996; Mangan, 1998; Armstrong, 1999;
Smith, 1999). In this section, I discuss the interrelated compo-
nents of consciousness that together constitute one’s experiences.
Analysis of the components (listed in Table 1) and the way they
are structured, demonstrates they are all information and that
consciousness is solely information of various kinds in a continu-
ously changing array.
or thirst; experienced emotions; felt moods; and evaluative feelings, such as
belief or liking.
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Table 1 | The components of conscious experience.
Component Example experiences
External sense experiences Visual, auditory, olfactory
Felt experiences
Transitional Touch, weight, hardness
Physical state Hunger, pain, proprioception
Emotional Anger, joy, fear
Mood Happiness, sadness
Evaluative Liking, doubt, comprehension
Associated information without qualia Intentions, identities of things
As noted previously (in Footnote 5), I use the term “informa-
tion” to mean data or facts, which is a broader meaning than the
usage in information theory as reduction in uncertainty. Some
examples should help clarifymy usage: The fact that I know some-
thing is information, and what I know is information. The fact
that I am in pain is information, but the pain itself is information
about possible bodily damage (Chapman and Nakamura, 1999).
The fact that I am angry is information, but my feeling angry
is itself information about my own response to events (Schwarz
and Clore, 1996). Each of these statements does more than sim-
ply reduce uncertainty; it establishes the meaning or context of
the information.
External sense experiences are information about real, imag-
ined, or remembered external objects or events, represented as
colors, shapes, sounds, smells, and so on.
Transitional feelings are based upon external sense data
detected via sensors in the skin or musculature. Experiences such
as contact with surfaces, awareness of surface texture, and aware-
ness of the hardness or weight of an object, are primarily based
upon exogenous data, but they are mediated by cutaneous and
muscle receptors. These feelings incorporate both exogenous and
endogenous information; to varying degrees they convey infor-
mation about the external situation and information about the
associated internal state (Katz, 1925/1989).
Physical state feelings represent information about internal
physical conditions (Schwarz and Clore, 1996). For example, pain
is a representation of bodily disturbance (Tye, 1997); it is nor-
mally a “message of peripheral tissue trauma” (Chapman and
Nakamura, 1999, p. 392); and hunger informs consciousness of
a need or desire for food.
Emotional feelings are representations (Damasio, 2001)—
information (Schwarz and Clore, 1996)—concerning our state
of physical and psychological responding to actual events, or to
memories, thoughts, or imaginings (Kleinginna and Kleinginna,
1981; Scherer, 1984; Lazarus, 1991; Izard, 1993).
Mood feelings represent emotional states that are not tied to
a particular situation, and are less well differentiated than other
emotional feelings (Clore and Bar-Anan, 2007; Isbell and Burns,
2007). They inform consciousness concerning one’s pre-existing
psychological state or response bias (Schwarz, 2002). Therefore,
these feelings are information (Schwarz and Clore, 1996).
Evaluative feelings are based upon nonconscious evaluations of
things, and innate responses or learned associations in relation
to them (Zajonc, 1980; Tesser and Martin, 1996; Smith and
DeCoster, 2000; Seager, 2002; Slovic et al., 2002; Velmans, 2002;
Northoff, 2008). These feelings qualify objects, events, people,
ideas, and so on, with regard to their meaning for us, our attitudes
to them, or our judgments about them, and result from noncon-
scious and immediate evaluation processes (Arnold, 1960, 1970;
Dixon, 1981; LeDoux, 1987; Lazarus, 1991; Tesser and Martin,
1996; Bargh and Ferguson, 2000). “People’s feelings inform them
about what they like, want and value” (Clore and Bar-Anan, 2007,
p. 14), but also what they understand, distrust, are familiar with,
and so on; they are information about one’s personal valuation of
things (Schwarz and Clore, 1996).
Information that lacks qualia, such as the identities of objects or
knowledge of one’s own intentions, constitutes another compo-
nent of experience. Evidence for conscious information without
associated qualia is discussed in Section 4.3.
We can draw two conclusions about the components of con-
sciousness from these observations:
(1) All the components of consciousness are solely information
in various forms; consciousness is a changing three-
dimensional perceptual array of information. It follows
that, since consciousness is solely information but is adap-
tive, and therefore can influence behavior, it must function
as input data to a process, or processes, that determine
behavior.
(2) Consciousness includes no mental processes; we experience
the results of mental processes, we do not experience the
actual processes. The only experiences that might superfi-
cially seem like processes are transitions from one group of
sensations to the next, from one feeling to the next, from
one experienced emotion or mood to the next, or from one
thought to the next. But each of these is merely a change
in the experienced information, which is generated by pro-
cesses outside of consciousness. These transitions correspond
to changing information in conscious neural structures, and
result from nonconscious processes. They are analogous to
events on a TV screen that merely reflect the changing out-
puts of unseen electronic processes elsewhere in the TV.
Consciousness includes no processes.
4.2. QUALIA INCORPORATE QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE
INFORMATION INTO CONSCIOUSNESS
Consciousness is information, and the information of
consciousness is represented or encoded as qualia; as sounds,
colors, feelings, and so on. Because we have a perceptual array
of qualia, we are conscious and this is important to us. But
(as noted in Section 3.6), qualia are also important because
they permit information about various qualitative properties,
such as color or texture, and quantitative properties, such as
relative size and location, to be incorporated into the infor-
mation of consciousness. The ability to incorporate these
properties is a feature of qualia; and no qualia have evolved
to represent data that do not have these properties (Section
4.3). Therefore, the ability to incorporate qualitative and quan-
titative properties would seem to be the reason that qualia
evolved.
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4.3. INFORMATION LACKING QUALIA THAT IS EXPERIENCED
There appears to be information associated with consciousness,
such as the identities or functions of things, and our own inten-
tions, which has no qualitative or quantitative properties, lacks
qualia, and has no location in the perceptual array. If I am given
an object whose function is unknown to me, and I examine its
colors, shape and size, I learn about its qualia. Perhaps I also
recognize that it is made of timber and metal. The qualia array
gives me clues to the identities of the materials from which it is
made, but my recognition of these materials depends upon my
past experience and is not a property of the qualia, as such. When
someone informs me of the purpose of the object, I learn some-
thing new about it, but its qualia remain unchanged. Initially, its
purpose is represented in words, but later I know what it is for
without putting that knowledge into words. The function of the
object and the materials from which it is constructed are knowl-
edge that is additional to what is directly conveyed by the qualia
array, and when these facts are well known they cease to be rep-
resented by words, so they are no longer represented by qualia of
any kind.
The existence of agnosias supports the view that the identities
of people and objects are normally associated with conscious-
ness. Agnosias are defects of awareness, failure of certain forms
of information to be experienced (Farah, 1992, 2004; Behrmann
and Nishimura, 2010). In the associative agnosias, certain infor-
mation associated with items being experienced, such as the
meanings of words or the identities of objects or faces, are not
consciously accessible, though there is evidence they are noncon-
sciously known. Since those of us with normal perceptual systems
are able to consciously remember and tell others about the iden-
tities of objects or people, these facts are normally associated with
consciousness when necessary.
There have been previous reports that some thoughts lack
qualia. Siewert (1998) gave examples of what he called “noni-
conic thinking,” everyday events when he considered his thoughts
were neither expressed in pictures nor in words: suddenly realiz-
ing he might have missed an appointment; discovering he did not
have his house key in its usual pocket, then remembering he had
transferred it to his coat pocket; or approaching a green traffic
light, and wondering if it was about to change. If thoughts are not
expressed in words or pictures; in sounds or images; and if they
have no associated feelings of any kind, they lack qualia.
Hurlburt, Heavey and Akhter (Heavey and Hurlburt, 2008;
Hurlburt and Akhter, 2008a,b) state there are well-defined expe-
riences, such as unspoken thoughts, wonderings, musings, and
unspoken knowledge of where we are, or what we are looking at,
that are conscious without qualia. They refer to these experiences
as “unsymbolized thinking,” and reported that about one quarter
of the randomly sampled experiences of 30 students included
unsymbolized thinking.
Qualia incorporate quantitative and qualitative properties of
things into consciousness, and that appears to be their func-
tion. Unsymbolized thought, such as knowledge of the iden-
tities of objects or people, one’s location, what one is doing,
where one is going, or one’s intentions, solutions to problems,
and so on, often have no associated quantitative and qualita-
tive properties, and no qualia. One experiences such information
by “just knowing it,” because it has none of the properties that
information represented by qualia have. Various unsymbolized
thoughts may be experienced, depending on what one is attend-
ing to, in much the same way as, for example, various sensory
information may be experienced, depending on what one is
attending to.
5. EVIDENCE THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE INPUT DATA
TO A FLEXIBLE RESPONSE MECHANISM
Consciousness is information, it is adaptive, and it is associ-
ated with intentional behavior. In this section I present evidence
that the biological function of consciousness is input data to a
mechanism that generates flexible, intentional responses.
5.1. CONSCIOUSNESS IS ASSOCIATED WITH A FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
MECHANISM
A list of various consciousness-related mental activities is
provided in Table 2. Inevitably, there are some overlaps between
the listed categories, and not every activity may be included,
but they cover the great majority of activities associated with
consciousness, sufficient to provide a basis for investigating the
biological role of consciousness. When we examine this range of
intentional behaviors associated with consciousness, we find that
consciousness is primarily associated with flexibility of behavior.
The last two categories inTable 2, mind wandering and dreams
during sleep, are anomalous because they do not have the voli-
tional or controlled quality of the other activities in the table,
and are generally disconnected from any definite tasks. The
Table 2 | Mental activities associated with consciousness.




Attending to a sudden or unexpected event
Close attention to a task
Alertness in unusual, interesting, or
unpredictable situations
Observing events as they occur






Remembering or reviewing events
Thinking through an expected event, or






Gaining special or general knowledge
Thinking about problems for creative
resolution over time
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anomalous processes have no obvious behavior-related func-
tion, though it has been reported that various functions related
to preparation for future adaptive behavior are associated with
dreaming (Hobson, 2010) and passive mental states, such as mind
wandering (Greicius et al., 2003; Buckner and Vincent, 2007). At
this stage, the anomalous processes seem unlikely to contribute to
our understanding the biological role of consciousness.
All of the activities in Table 2, apart from the anomalous
processes, are associated with generation of, or preparation
for, nonautomatic behaviors to deal with current, expected, or
possible future situations. The situations may be internal or exter-
nal physical conditions, or social conditions, so the actions could
be related to personal safety, social status, homeostasis, or other
considerations. These activities are all relatively flexible com-
pared to the stimulus-response structure of automatic actions
such as the orienting reflex or looming reflex (Schiff, 1965; Ball
and Tronick, 1971), fixed action patterns (for example, Raven
and Johnson, 1992), unintended motor mimicry (Bavelas et al.,
1986; Chartrand and Bargh, 1999), classically or instrumentally
conditioned responses, and learned behavior that has become
automatized. Consciousness is associated with relatively flexible
responding (Baars, 1988), that is, with a flexible response mecha-
nism, or possibly a combination of such mechanisms (the FRM).
The FRM selects or devises responses to current situations,
causes the automatic initiation and control of behavior (Bargh,
1992), prepares for possible future events, solves problems, and
makes choices. Each of these must be achieved by integration
and manipulation of relevant data. The FRM must arrive at
nonautomatic solutions to problems and determine behavior by
information processing of some kind, and therefore must consist
of a processor operating with relevant data.
5.2. THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE MECHANISM OPERATES WITH
SELECTED INFORMATION
Automatic programs determine most of our responses, and ini-
tiate and control all of our actions (Bargh, 1992; Bargh and
Chartrand, 1999). The FRM is an alternative system for deter-
mining behavior that functions quite differently from automatic
programs.
An example of the operation of automatic and intentional sys-
tems is the two modes of attention control: automatic detection
and orienting, and controlled search (Posner and Snyder, 1975;
Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977; Posner, 1980; Norman and Shallice,
1986). A second example of the operation of these systems is the
two processes that contribute to reasoning: automatic, intuitive
or associative processes; and deliberative or controlled processes
(Sloman, 1996; Bargh and Ferguson, 2000; Smith and DeCoster,
2000; Stanovich and West, 2000; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002;
Evans, 2003; Evans and Stanovich, 2013). The duality of mech-
anisms for attention control and reasoning are aspects of the
broader duality of mechanisms for generating all our behavior:
automatic action programs and the FRM.
As noted in Section 5.1, automatic action programs include
innate responses, conditioned responses, and action sequences
that were once intentional but have become automatized, and
each of these is released by a specific stimulus. Thus, when
driving, if a child runs into the road, one’s foot hits the brake
automatically and very quickly; the automatized driving program
ignores all other information, and responds to the external sense
data about the emergency. The same principle applies, though
less obviously, as we automatically and continuously respond to
sense data indicating some more minor adjustments to our driv-
ing are needed. In general, automatic action programs, whether
innate or learned, respond very rapidly to a relevant stimulus and
ignore all other information (Bargh, 1992; Kihlstrom, 1993), and
this involves minimal processing of the sense data.
The flexible response mechanism operates differently from
automatic programs; it manipulates a selection of relevant infor-
mation in search of an appropriate response to a particular event
or problem. The input to the FRM has to include all essen-
tial information so as to maximize the possibility of an optimal
response, but must exclude or inhibit information that is irrele-
vant to the task (Tipper, 1985; Allport, 1987; Tipper et al., 1994;
Wühr and Frings, 2008). Exclusion of irrelevant information
minimizes unproductive information manipulations that might
increase the time taken to arrive at a response, or cause the FRM to
switch to a different task. The need to control its input data means
the FRM must employ an information selection system of some
kind. The operations of the FRM use the selected information,
and are generally isolated from all other information.
The suggestion that there is a mechanism associated with the
FRM that selects its input data is supported by the work of
Leopold and Logothetis (1999). In their review of research on
multistable perception, they found evidence of “direct interven-
tion in the processing of the sensory input by brain structures
associated with planning and motor programming” (p. 254),
and concluded that the brain areas involved are “those that ulti-
mately use and act upon the perceptual representations” (p.
261). A more recent review of multistable perception by Sterzer
et al. (2009, p. 317) agreed; they wrote that “high-level fron-
toparietal processes continuously re-evaluate the current inter-
pretation of the sensory input and initiate changes in subjective
perception.” Subjectively, perceptual switches during multistable
perception appear to be automatic, and one might not expect
that systems associated with planning and motor programming,
which use and act upon the perceptual representations, would
be involved in sensory data selection or interpretation, were
it not for the fact that these operations are necessary for the
FRM, which logically must have an associated mechanism for
selecting its input data. Therefore, these reviews provide some
support for the view that consciousness is the data input to
the FRM.
In concluding his review of studies of attentional responses
to visual data, Theeuwes (2010, p. 97) wrote, “during the first
sweep of information through the brain (<150ms) visual selec-
tion is completely stimulus-driven. Initial selection is based on
the salience of objects present in the visual field.... Only later in
time (>150ms). . . volitional control based on expectancy and
goal set will bias visual selection in a top–down manner.” The
sequence and timing Theeuwes reported are as would be expected
on the basis that a mechanism associated with the FRM selects
data for attention but, because the FRM operates by manip-
ulating relevant data, it is slower than automatically triggered
responses.
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5.3. THE INPUT DATA REQUIREMENTS OF THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
MECHANISM CORRESPOND TO THE PROPERTIES OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
The flexible response mechanism requires a restricted data input,
and consciousness, which is closely associated with operations of
the FRM, is a limited information flow. This suggests that con-
sciousness could be the input data to the FRM. Support for this
view is provided by the fact that the properties of consciousness
correspond to the necessary properties of the input data to the
FRM:
(1) In order to select or devise responses to events, the FRM
requires access to relevant exogenous and endogenous data.
Consciousness incorporates these as sights, sounds, etc., feel-
ings of various kinds, and unsymbolized thoughts.
(2) The FRM requires knowledge of various qualitative and
quantitative properties of things, such as size, shape and loca-
tion; and the qualia array of consciousness has apparently
evolved to meet this need (Section 4.2).
(3) The FRM requires input data that is a restricted represen-
tation of events, because information that is irrelevant to
its computations has to be excluded. Any actions following
on from the work of the FRM are controlled by sensori-
motor systems specialized for those actions, which employ
accurate and continuously updated data for action (Rossetti
and Pisella, 2002; Goodale and Milner, 2004; Goodale
and Humphrey, 2005; Goodale, 2007; Umiltá, 2007).
Consciousness is an incomplete representation of events, as
is demonstrated by inattentional blindness (Neisser, 1979;
Mack and Rock, 1998; Simons and Chabris, 1999). The fact
that our experiences are incomplete representations of reality
is sometimes noticeable in ordinary life.
(4) Some operations of the FRM require information to be held
longer than the brief period that data for action are held. In
order to make a complex choice or decision, the input data
may need to be retained for some time whilst the FRM pro-
cesses the options and arrives at an outcome. And, when an
intended action is delayed, when an action extends over time,
or when there is an intended sequence of actions, the input
to the FRM may need to be held for an extended period
to ensure the action is completed appropriately. Complex
decisions and complex intentional actions may require that
relevant data be held much longer than the very brief period
that data for action are held, and this is a characteristic
of consciousness (Darwin and Turvey, 1972; Tiitinen et al.,
1994; Damasio, 1995; Rossetti, 1998; Dehaene and Naccache,
2001).
(5) Bridgeman et al. (1997, p. 468) found that the “cognitive
map,” that is visual consciousness, “can achieve great sen-
sitivity to small motions or translations of objects in the
visual world by using relative motion or relative position as
a cue.” By comparison, data driving visually guided action
“does not have the resolution and sensitivity to fine-grained
spatial relationships that the cognitive map has.” Input data
allowing increased sensitivity to movement would be an asset
to the FRM, in that it could permit enhanced respond-
ing in situations of slowly emerging danger or opportunity,
in unusual or unpredictable situations, or in some social
interactions.
(6) The data input to the FRM needs to have a variable corre-
lation with current reality. When responding to a current
external situation, the input information has to be closely
aligned with the actual events, but when the FRM is reviewing
past events, planning future actions, or solving a problem, the
required information may have little or no correspondence
with current external reality. Consciousness can be informa-
tion about one’s current situation, or it can be information
about something quite different that is receiving one’s
attention.
(7) Input to the FRM needs to be primarily context-related
unlike data for action, which are self-related. For example,
planning future action requires that the context be speci-
fied. When driving on an unfamiliar route I need to know
the contextual features of a particular side road that I must
take to reach my destination. However, at the road junc-
tion, I will need to make movements that take into account
external factors but are determined in relation to the rele-
vant parts of my own body; the data for action system must
precisely determine my limb movements to control the vehi-
cle. Data for action are instructions to automatic programs
that move parts of the body, whereas input to the FRM needs
to be a representation of the event that includes the con-
text of the perceiver (Rossetti and Pisella, 2002; Goodale and
Milner, 2004; Milner and Goodale, 2008). Consciousness has
sensory data in context as would be expected of the input
to the FRM.
Thus, there is a correlation between the properties of conscious-
ness and the properties required of input data that will allow
the FRM to compute responses to a range of actual or expected
situations. For this situation to have arisen, mechanisms that
determine the various properties of consciousness and of the
FRM (and its data selection mechanism), must have evolved in
a complementary manner over very long evolutionary time. This
could only have occurred because consciousness is the data input
to the FRM.
5.4. INFORMATION MISSING FROM CONSCIOUSNESS MAY
ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OUTPUT OF THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
MECHANISM
Whenever any important information relevant to the computa-
tions of the FRM is missing from consciousness, the output from
the FRM tends to be adversely affected:
(1) People with blindsight do not spontaneously respond to
data in their blindfield, even though they have nonconscious
knowledge of it (Marcel, 1986; Weiskrantz, 1997; Dietrich,
2007; Persaud and Cowey, 2008). Blindsight patients lack
visual consciousness in their blindfield, and therefore lack the
necessary inputs to the FRM for making spontaneous inten-
tional responses. The blindsight patient who worked with
Persaud and Cowey (2008) was unable to follow instructions
in relation to data in his blindfield. Analogously, “Dee,” in
Goodale and Milner (2004), who has visual agnosia, cannot
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state the orientation of a slot but she can post a letter through
it, and cannot state the shapes of obstacles but can walk up a
rough track. Intentional action, in the form of responses to
questions, is not possible for her because the necessary visual
properties of objects are missing from consciousness, though
they are nonconsciously known and acted upon.
(2) Damasio (1995) reported that patients with damage to
brain regions involved in the generation of emotional and
other feelings consistently exhibit dysfunctional reasoning,
decision-making and behavior. This would be expected if
consciousness is input to the FRM, because people who
lack emotional and other feelings lack the nonconscious
evaluations these feelings represent, which are sometimes
needed to get the best outcomes from complex or difficult
decisions (Clore et al., 2001; Clore and Huntsinger, 2007).
(3) If one intends a non-habitual action, one is only able to
act on one’s intention if it is remembered, if it is experi-
enced, at the appropriate time. And, if one begins an intended
non-habitual sequence of actions but starts thinking about
something else part way through, onemay end up completing
an unintended habitual action sequence if part of the non-
habitual action sequence coincides with it (Reason, 1979;
Norman, 1981). Without the necessary input data at each
stage, the FRMmay not keep the action sequence on track.
The adverse effect on the output of the FRM when significant
information is missing from consciousness is further evidence
that consciousness is input data to the FRM.
5.5. CONSCIOUSNESS IS INPUT TO THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
MECHANISM
In summary, consciousness has biological value and therefore
must influence behavior. But consciousness is solely information
in various forms, and, as such, can only influence behavior if it is
input to processes that determine behavior. Evidence supporting
the proposition that consciousness is the input data to the FRM is
provided by the following facts:
(1) Consciousness is associated with actions of the FRM.
(2) To function effectively, the FRM requires a selected data
input, and the properties of consciousness correspond to the
requirements for the input data to the FRM.
(3) There is experimental evidence that experienced information
influences the outputs of the FRM.
(4) When important information relevant to the task of the FRM
is missing from consciousness the FRM tends to malfunction
in some way.
(5) Our subjective experience is that when we are attending to
a novel or interesting event, paying close attention to a task,
interacting with people, learning a skill, or thinking about a
problem or an expected event, our perceptions are knowledge
about events that activates mental processes which devise,
prepare, initiate, adjust, or control our actions, or determine
the direction of our thoughts.
However, it is common experience that consciousness can be
stages in processing by the FRM, such as when one is thinking
through a problem or mentally rehearsing an expected future
event. A stage in processing is both output from one stage and
input to the next stage, but the functional role of conscious-
ness can only be as input to further processing. One sometimes
perceives that consciousness is the output from decisions, plan-
ning, creative processes, or logical thought, but these are probably
always inputs to further processing, such as thoughts, determin-
ing present actions or intended future action, telling other people,
or committing to memory for possible future use. Consciousness
is inevitably output from some process of data selection or
manipulation, but its biological function is the data input to
subsequent processes of data manipulation, determining action,
interaction with people, and so on, and it would appear that is
why it evolved.
6. CENTRAL TO THE THEORY ARE THREE CLAIMS THAT MAY
BE TESTABLE
This theory makes three claims that may prove to be testable, and
if any of these claims were shown to be wrong, the theory, in its
present form, would have been disproved.
First, the theory states that consciousness is the data input
to a nonconscious mechanism, or combination of mechanisms,
(the FRM) which determines every aspect of one’s life that is not
determined by an automatic program or mechanism. (In some
circumstances, conscious information may become input data to
automatic programs. It is also possible that nonconscious infor-
mation may influence the processes of the FRM directly, and not
just via its effects on consciousness, but I have been unable to find
any evidence of this).
Second, consciousness functions solely as input data; every
component of consciousness is information in some form, and
no part of one’s experience is ever not information.
Third, all mental processing is nonconscious; one does not
experience any mental process. Therefore, one cannot have direct
knowledge of the reasons for one’s actions, intentions, choices,
or decisions; or of how one’s thoughts or feelings originated.
According to the theory, direct knowledge of these is not possible
because consciousness has no access to the processes that deter-
mine them.One can only know the reason for any of one’s actions,
intentions, choices, decisions, feelings and thoughts, by indirect
means such as an inference or a guess.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The behavior of all organisms is principally determined by
automatic response programs: innate responses such as orienting
and fixed action patterns, classical and operant conditioning, and
other learned behaviors. Each of these is automatically released,
or triggered, by a predetermined type of stimulus.
However, organisms that possess only automatic responses
may sometimes have no response to match a situation that con-
fronts them, and some kind of best choice response, no response,
or a random response is used, any of which could result in a
missed opportunity or a risk to the organism. Because of this
vulnerability, a flexible response mechanism (FRM), which may
perhaps be a combination of mechanisms, has evolved to generate
responses to novel situations, and consciousness is a component
of this mechanism.
www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 697 | 13
Earl The biological function of consciousness
The FRM manipulates relevant incoming data, in conjunc-
tion with previous learning, in search of an appropriate response
to a situation. This can result in suitable behavior being gener-
ated, which, if it is repeated, may eventually become automatized
(Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977; Bargh and Chartrand, 1999).
The FRM needs access to all information relevant to the sit-
uation to which it is seeking to respond, but any information
that is unnecessary or irrelevant to the task needs to be excluded
from its input because it could increase the complexity of oper-
ations and the time taken to achieve an outcome. Hence, a data
selection system appears to have evolved, in conjunction with the
FRM, which permits access to necessary information and inhibits
access to irrelevant information. The operations of the FRM are
generally isolated from information that has not been selected.
In order for the FRM to function optimally, its input data need
to include qualitative and quantitative information, such as the
size, shape, location, and movement of objects. Qualia as a per-
ceptual array allow such information to be incorporated into the
input data, and they make the input data conscious. Other forms
of information (unsymbolized thoughts) that are relevant to the
task of the FRM but do not have quantitative or qualitative prop-
erties, such as knowledge of the identities or functions of objects,
or of one’s own intentions, are also included in the input data, but
without qualia.
The FRM utilizes consciousness as its input data and
generally cannot access other information, therefore relevant
endogenous information has to be included in conscious-
ness. Endogenous information may be experienced as felt
sensations, emotions, moods, and evaluative feelings, such as
liking or disbelief. And when endogenous or exogenous infor-
mation is particularly important, a measure of its importance is
included in consciousness as experienced emotionality or affect
strength.
One’s ongoing experience is often an intermediate stage of pro-
cessing or an output from processing in the FRM, but it is possible
that in every case these are inputs to further processing or to other
tasks of the FRM. When the FRM has no definite task, it con-
tinues to be active with dreams, fantasies and mind wandering.
Whether these operations have biological value, and in what way
consciousness might contribute, is not yet clear.
The theory that consciousness is input data to a mechanism
for generating nonautomatic responses, leads to explanations
for the following central features of consciousness, experimental
observations, and everyday properties of consciousness:
(1) The existence of consciousness as a qualia array (Section 4.2)
plus unsymbolized thoughts (Section 4.3).
(2) The representation of endogenous information as experi-
enced sensations and feelings of various types (Section 4.1).
(3) The experience of the importance of events as affect strength
or emotionality.
(4) Consciousness is an incomplete representation because irrel-
evant information is excluded from the input to the FRM,
and this explains experimental observations of inattentional
blindness (Section 5.3).
(5) Distractions interfere with efforts to solve a difficult prob-
lem because they represent information that is irrelevant to
the problem, which may slow the operations of the FRM, or
provoke a task switch away from the topic it is working on
(Section 5.2).
(6) The FRM is generally isolated from nonconscious informa-
tion, leading to observations that blindsight patients do not
intentionally and spontaneously initiate responses to events
in their blind field; and to the everyday observation that an
intended counter-habitual action is only possible when the
intention is in mind (Section 5.4).
(7) If one is distracted during a non-habitual action sequence,
one’s actions may be captured by a habitual action sequence
and completed in an unintended way. This can be understood
in terms of the FRM needing appropriate input to continue
the intentional action whenever part of the new sequence
coincides with an established habitual action (Section 5.4).
(8) Damage to brain regions involved in the generation of
emotional and other feelings is consistently associated
with dysfunctional reasoning, decision-making and behav-
ior. Because these feelings are missing, the input to the
FRM is incomplete, and dysfunctional responses are likely
when information that would have been represented by the
missing feelings is necessary for an appropriate outcome
(Section 5.4).
Prior to the first appearance of the FRM in organisms, all of
their systems for selecting and initiating behavior were entirely
nonconscious, automatic programs (Reber, 1992; Evans, 2008).
The FRM is also a functionally nonconscious response system, but
with its information input mostly in the form of an array of qualia
that provides its possessors with experiences.
The material presented here constitutes the essential elements
of a theory that consciousness is the data input to a flexi-
ble response mechanism, but there remain many unanswered
questions: What is the relationship of the FRM with automatic
response programs and with action control systems; what are
the mechanics of information selection and data manipulation in
the FRM; is the FRM a unitary system or a number of “flexible
modules” for decisions, oversight of intentional actions, planning,
problem solving, and so on, which separately access consciousness
as their input; and why did an array of qualia evolve as themethod
for qualitative and quantitative data entry to the processes of the
FRM?
One would like to know how the FRM operates in non-human
species, how its presence can be detected with confidence in
non-human species, and whether the FRM has independently
evolved in different taxonomic groups (such as cephalopods),
which one might expect, since the FRM is a valuable asset
that enhances biological fitness. If the FRM has independently
evolved in different taxonomic groups, it is possible, though per-
haps unlikely, that the problem of representing quantitative and
qualitative data may have been solved in ways that do not require
a qualia array and do not confer consciousness on their posses-
sors. When we better understand how the FRM evolved and how
it functions, we may have more insight into such matters.
It is my hope that this research will open up new directions
in the study of the minds of humans and other animals, and
that the FRM theory of consciousness may be of use to some of
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the many researchers who seek to alleviate mental disability and
suffering.
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